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Rescued from the Grave and Then 
Covered with Mud: Justice Scalia and the 
Unfinished Restoration of the 
Confrontation Right 
Richard D. Friedman
†
 
Some years before his death, when asked which was his 
favorite among his opinions, Antonin Scalia named Crawford v. 
Washington.
1
 It was a good choice. Justice Scalia’s opinion in 
Crawford reclaimed the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment to the Constitution and restored it to its rightful 
place as one of the central protections of our criminal justice 
system. He must have found it particularly satisfying that the 
opinion achieved this result by focusing on the historical 
meaning of the text, and that it gained the concurrence of all 
but two members of the Court, from all ideological positions. 
I. THE OLD REGIME 
The Confrontation Clause expresses in simple terms a 
basic principle that has been essential to common-law 
jurisprudence for centuries, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him . . . .”
2
 In other words, a witness against 
an accused must testify face-to-face with the accused—not, say, 
by speaking to the police in the stationhouse. And yet, for most 
of American history articulating the nature of the confrontation 
right was of relatively little importance, because pretty much 
any result that the Supreme Court could achieve by relying on 
 
†  Arlene and Allan F. Smith Professor of Law, University of Michigan 
Law School. Thanks to Sam Gross. Copyright © 2016 by Richard D. Friedman. 
 1. 541 U.S. 36 (2004); see also JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE 
SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 369 (2007) (noting that when asked 
to identify “the favorite of his opinions,” Justice Scalia “came up with an 
esoteric case interpreting the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.” 
What counts as esoteric evidently is a matter of context). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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the Clause it could also achieve by construing the infinitely 
malleable doctrine of hearsay. That changed in 1965, when the 
Court held that the Confrontation Clause expresses a 
fundamental right incorporated against the states by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
3
 Now it really mattered what the 
Clause meant, because the Clause binds the states but federal 
conceptions of hearsay law do not. Not until 1980 did the Court 
attempt to articulate a comprehensive conception of the Clause. 
And when it did, in Ohio v. Roberts,
4
 the result was a failure. 
The Roberts doctrine, especially as it was developed by 
subsequent cases, virtually constitutionalized contemporary 
conceptions of the law of hearsay. First, the scope of the Clause, 
like that of hearsay doctrine, extended to any out-of-court 
statement offered to prove the truth of what it asserted.
5
 
Second, the Clause usually permitted such a statement to be 
admitted if it fit within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception,”
6
 
and even if no such exception applied, admissibility might still 
be supported “by a showing of particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness”
7
—a doctrine that closely resembled the 
residual exception to the hearsay rule, now set forth in Federal 
Rule of Evidence 807. The Clause barred admission of some 
out-of-court statements if the declarant was available but did 
not testify at trial—but it appeared that the Court would apply 
the unavailability requirement only in settings in which 
ordinary hearsay doctrine did as well.
8
 
The most significant problem with the Roberts doctrine 
was that it did not articulate any principle worthy of respect. 
The Court declared that the doctrine was meant to weed out 
unreliable evidence.
9
 But that would be an odd goal—that 
evidence is unreliable cannot preclude admissibility, because 
even live eyewitness testimony is notoriously unreliable. The 
very point of a trial is to assess a complete body of evidence, 
some parts of which will usually point in opposite directions, 
which necessarily means that some are unreliable. Moreover, if 
reliability appears to be all that is at stake, the trial court’s 
 
 3. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
 4. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 5. See id. at 66 (indicating that the Clause operates “when a hearsay 
declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial”). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986). 
 9. See, e.g., Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65. 
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inclination will usually be to admit the evidence, because it will 
usually appear that truth determination will be advanced by 
letting the jurors hear the evidence rather than shutting their 
eyes and ears to it. 
And so the Roberts doctrine generated a great deal of 
dissatisfaction, from academics and others, including Supreme 
Court Justices. There were glimmerings that some Justices 
would favor a different view of the Confrontation Clause. In 
two settings involving the question of what trial procedures 
constitute satisfactory confrontation under the Clause—as 
opposed to the issue covered by Roberts, when the Clause 
tolerates admissibility of a prior statement—Justice Scalia 
wrote in support of a bright-line understanding of the Clause. 
In Maryland v. Craig, writing in dissent for the Court’s three 
most liberal members and himself, he objected to an all-
circumstances-considered approach, articulated for the 
majority by Justice O’Connor, to the question of whether a 
child can sometimes testify against a criminal defendant by a 
remote electronic connection, without the ability to see the 
accused; the Court’s decision, he said, conspicuously violated “a 
categorical guarantee of the Constitution.”
10 
And in 2002, he 
issued a statement when seven members of the Court voted not 
to transmit to Congress a proposed amendment to Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 26 that would have more generally 
allowed witnesses who could not come to court to testify by 
remote electronic means. Making clear that their opposition 
was based on the Confrontation Clause, he thundered, 
“[v]irtual confrontation might be sufficient to protect virtual 
constitutional rights; I doubt whether it is sufficient to protect 
real ones.”
11
 
And meanwhile, in two cases some Justices directly 
questioned the Roberts doctrine. In White v. Illinois in 1992, 
Justice Thomas wrote a concurrence, joined by Justice Scalia, 
indicating sympathy for the view put forth by the United States 
(in an amicus brief written in large part by Samuel Alito) that 
the Clause “should apply only to those persons who provide in-
court testimony or the functional equivalent, such as affidavits, 
depositions, or confessions that are made in contemplation of 
legal proceedings.”
12
 And in Lilly v. Virginia in 1999, drawing 
 
 10. 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 11. Amendments to Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, 207 F.R.D. 89, 94 (2002) (statement of Scalia, J.). 
 12. White v. Illinois, 506 U.S. 346, 364 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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on an amicus brief submitted by the American Civil Liberties 
Union,
13
 Justice Breyer wrote a concurrence suggesting that the 
prevailing view of the Clause was arguably too broad in that 
“[i]t would make a constitutional issue out of the admission of 
any relevant hearsay statement” and too narrow to the extent 
it would allow “out-of-court statements prepared as testimony 
for a trial when such statements happen to fall within some 
well-recognized hearsay rule exception.”
14
 Justice Thomas 
wrote a brief opinion adhering to his White concurrence, and 
Justice Scalia wrote an even briefer opinion that contained this 
pointed and arresting passage: 
During a custodial interrogation, Mark Lilly told police officers that 
petitioner [his brother Ben] committed the charged murder. The 
prosecution introduced a tape recording of these statements at trial 
without making Mark available for cross-examination. In my view, 
that is a paradigmatic Confrontation Clause violation.
15
 
How refreshing! Justice Scalia asked us to look at the 
circumstances in which Mark Lilly implicated Ben and the fact 
that Ben never had a chance to cross-examine Mark. That was 
all we needed to know, in his view, to recognize that use of 
Mark’s statement against Ben had violated Ben’s confrontation 
right. 
Before Crawford, then, at least three Justices, Justice 
Scalia among them, had indicated a willingness to replace 
Roberts by a categorical approach that applied only to certain 
types of out-of-court statements but that did not depend on an 
assessment of reliability for determining a Confrontation 
Clause violation. The Roberts doctrine still stood, however; no 
decision had undercut or chipped away at its foundations. And 
then, with stunning suddenness, Crawford swept the entire 
edifice aside and replaced it with another. 
II. THE CRAWFORD TRANSFORMATION 
The basic conception of Crawford is simple. The 
Confrontation Clause does not speak in terms of hearsay, or 
reasonableness, or reliability. Rather, it says in straightforward 
terms that the accused has a right to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him. Witnesses, Justice Scalia wrote, are 
 
 13. I was one of the principal authors of the brief, along with the late 
Margaret Berger. 
 14. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 141–42 (1999). 
 15. Id. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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those who “bear testimony.”
16
 Drawing on historical practice, he 
reached the conclusion that “[t]estimonial statements of 
witnesses absent from trial” are allowed by the Confrontation 
Clause “only where the declarant is unavailable, and only 
where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine.”
17
 Wisely, he did not attempt to define the bounds of 
the key term “testimonial”; that would have been too much to 
bite off in one case. But he asserted bluntly that the statement 
involved there—description of a criminal incident made to the 
police several hours later, in the stationhouse, under 
considerable formality, and in response to “structured police 
questioning”—was testimonial “under any conceivable 
definition.”
18
 
The scope and power of Crawford should not be 
underestimated. The opinion simply discarded the mush of 
Roberts and established in its place a conception of the 
confrontation right that was textually and historically sound 
and that expressed a simple, straightforward principle that 
most members of our society recognize as a core part of our 
criminal justice system: a witness against an accused must 
testify face-to-face with the accused, under oath and subject to 
cross-examination, if reasonably possible at trial, and not in 
any other way, such as by speaking to the police in the 
stationhouse. 
To be sure, the opinion was far from perfect. It went out of 
its way to “reiterate that, when the declarant appears for cross-
examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no 
constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial 
statements”
19
—thus entrenching a doctrine, which Justice 
Scalia had helped to develop,
20
 that failed to recognize how the 
confrontation right is impaired if by the time of cross-
examination the witness is no longer standing by an assertion 
previously made. Parts of the opinion seem to me to put too 
much emphasis on the state of the law “at the time of the 
 
 16. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). Justice Scalia’s use of 
Webster’s Dictionary for this definition has been derided. But it is an oddity of 
the English language that we use words with different roots for testimony and 
for those who give it. Had Justice Scalia said that witnesses are those who 
make “witnessy” statements, the reasoning would have been clear, but the 
inelegance would have been hard to tolerate. 
 17. Id. at 59. 
 18. Id. at 53 n.4. 
 19. Id. at 58 n.9. 
 20. See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988). 
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framing,”
21
 as if the Confrontation Clause froze in time a 
snapshot of the law of 1791, rather than expressing (what most 
of the opinion addresses) the broad conceptions that the 
Framers understood to be expressed by the right. And I believe 
the emphasis throughout much of the opinion on governmental 
abuse is mistaken; a witness can make a testimonial 
statement, the use of which at trial would violate the 
confrontation right, without any involvement of government 
officials at all. These are not small matters, but they do not 
minimize how remarkable the achievement of Crawford was. 
III. FORENSIC LAB REPORTS 
The subsequent history has not been so happy, but I will 
begin with one very bright spot: Justice Scalia’s opinion for a 
bare majority of the Court in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.
22
 
In accordance with state law, the prosecution had proven that 
substances in question were cocaine by introducing certificates 
from forensic lab analysts, without presenting the analysts for 
confrontation. Justice Scalia’s opinion properly declared this 
practice a straightforward violation of Crawford. And one-by-
one, he gave a deserving back-of-the-hand to each of the 
contentions made by the state or the four dissenters: the 
witnesses weren’t “accusatory”;
23
 they weren’t “‘conventional’ 
(or ‘‘typical’ or ‘ordinary’)” witnesses;
24
 they weren’t reporting 
historical events but rather the results of “neutral, scientific 
testing”;
25
 the certificates should be deemed exempt from the 
Confrontation Clause because they were official or business 
records;
26
 the accused had the right to subpoena the analysts if 
he wanted to;
27
 requiring the analysts to testify live would 
create an intolerable burden on the trial process.
28
 With respect 
to each, Justice Scalia’s response was, in effect, “doesn’t matter, 
even if it were true.” The sole problem with this magnificent 
opinion, in my view, is that it gained the votes of only five 
members of the Court. 
 
 21. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54 n.5. 
 22. 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
 23. Id. at 313. 
 24. Id. at 315. 
 25. Id. at 317. 
 26. Id. at 321–22. 
 27. Id. at 324–25. 
 28. Id. at 325. 
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The remaining four—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito—have not given in. Indeed, it 
appears that they hoped that Justice Sotomayor’s accession to 
the Court would help them quickly undo part of Melendez-Diaz, 
but if so they were unsuccessful.
29
 In Bullcoming v. New 
Mexico,
30
 they again dissented, believing that although the 
author of the forensic lab certificate in question again did not 
testify at trial it should have sufficed that another analyst from 
the lab, who did not observe any of the testing, did so.
31
 Finally, 
in Williams v. Illinois,
32
 the foursome achieved a limited 
victory. In that case, swabs taken from a rape victim and sent 
to a commercial lab led to generation of a male DNA profile 
that presumably belonged to the perpetrator, and search of a 
DNA database led to identification of the accused. At his trial, 
an analyst testified to the match but nobody from the 
commercial lab testified. The foursome would have held on 
various grounds—including that the lab had made no 
statements making an accusation of a “targeted” individual—
that there was no confrontation violation. The other five 
Justices disagreed with virtually every aspect of their 
reasoning. But Justice Thomas agreed with them that the 
report was not testimonial, on the idiosyncratic ground—“one 
Justice’s one-justice view,” as Justice Kagan pungently put 
it
33
—that the report was not sufficiently formal.
34
 
 
 29. Four days after the decision in Melendez-Diaz, the Court granted 
certiorari in Briscoe v. Virginia (in which I represented the petitioners). 559 
U.S. 32 (2010). The grant was puzzling, because the question presented by the 
Briscoe petition appeared to have been decided in Melendez-Diaz. There was 
widespread speculation that the foursome hoped that the replacement of 
Justice Souter by Justice Sotomayor, whose nomination had been announced, 
would lead to a different result. And Justice Scalia lent force to the 
speculation at argument, when he asked, “Why is this case here except as an 
opportunity to upset Melendez-Diaz?” and then added, “I'm not criticizing 
Virginia; I'm criticizing us for taking the case.” Transcript of Oral Argument 
at 58–59, Briscoe v. Virginia, 559 U.S. 32 (2010) (No. 07-11191). It quickly 
became apparent at argument that Justice Sotomayor was not going to upset a 
seven-month-old precedent, and two weeks later the Court did what it 
probably should have done from the start: remanded Briscoe for 
reconsideration in light of Melendez-Diaz. 
 30. 564 U.S. 647 (2011). 
 31. See id. at 674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 32. 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). 
 33. Id. at 2277 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 34. I posted the report on my blog, saying, “it seems to me that simply 
looking at the report demonstrates whatever degree of formality any [J]ustice 
is likely to require for a statement to be considered testimonial.” Richard D. 
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Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming are still the law, and there 
is no majority opinion in Williams. Lower courts have 
expressed confusion about the law governing forensic lab 
reports, but so far the Court has shown no inclination to clear 
matters up. Perhaps when, ultimately, Justice Scalia’s seat is 
filled, the Court will step back in. But, given that a new Justice 
would have no more votes than Justice Scalia did, and could 
not cast them any more soundly in this realm than he did, I do 
not anticipate any favorable developments in the near term. 
IV. FRESH ACCUSATIONS 
I am even less happy about the state of the law in the other 
area that has generated considerable post-Crawford 
development: fresh accusations of a crime, typically made by 
the alleged victim. 
The trouble began with Davis v. Washington.
35
 Under that 
caption, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court decided its 
first two substantive Confrontation Clause cases after 
Crawford, both involving oral statements made to law 
enforcement officials by alleged victims describing acts of 
domestic violence. One of the two, Hammon v. Indiana,
36
 did 
not prove difficult. There, the speaker made the statement at 
home, a considerable time after the incident, to a police officer 
who had responded to a 911 call, while another police officer 
held the alleged assailant, her husband, at bay. But the wife 
did not testify at trial, which was held before Crawford, and the 
prosecution was allowed to introduce both her oral statement 
and an affidavit that she completed immediately after. After 
Crawford, the state supreme court recognized that admission of 
the affidavit was improper (though harmless, it held), but 
insisted that the oral statement was not testimonial. I 
represented the husband before the Supreme Court, and I was 
confident that the judgment would be reversed; if this evidence 
were permissible, then a witness could testify against an 
accused by speaking to the police in her living room. Justice 
Scalia also regarded the case as an easy one, as apparently did 
 
Friedman, The Cellmark Report, and What It Shows, THE CONFRONTATION 
BLOG (Dec. 15, 2011, 12:43 AM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2011/ 
12/cellmark-report-and-what-it-shows.html. I was so wrong. 
 35. 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 36. 546 U.S. 976 (2005). Hammon was ultimately argued in tandem with 
Davis. See id. 
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seven other members of the Court;
37
 only Justice Thomas 
dissented, as in Williams, asserting alone that the statement 
was not sufficiently formal to be testimonial. 
I would have preferred nine votes, but eight was not bad. 
The other part of the tandem, Davis itself, was another matter. 
There, the alleged victim, Michelle McCottry, made her 
statements as part of a 911 call, in obvious distress and 
apparently beginning while her assailant was still in the house; 
he was, in any event, at large throughout the conversation.
38
 
Based on his questioning at argument, I had guessed that 
Justice Scalia would conclude that the statements were 
testimonial; I had hoped that he, if not the Court, would adopt 
the principle that any statement to a known police officer 
accusing another person of a crime is per se testimonial. But 
instead, the Court unanimously held that the first part of the 
conversation—enough to support Davis’s conviction—was not 
testimonial.
39
 This decision came during Chief Justice Roberts’s 
first term on the Court, and I believe the unanimity may have 
reflected his attempt to generate more consensus among the 
Justices. In any event, given the result, it would have been 
better had it been based on the assertion (whether accurate or 
not is another matter) that, in the heat of the moment, a person 
in McCottry’s position would not be focused on the probable 
evidentiary use of her statements. Instead, Justice Scalia 
articulated an amorphous standard under which, if the 
statement was made for the “primary purpose” of resolving “an 
ongoing emergency,” it is not deemed testimonial.
40
 Justice 
Thomas properly pointed out in his separate opinion that this 
standard was vague and manipulable; a speaker will often have 
multiple purposes, and a court will have a free range of choice 
in identifying the “primary” one.
41
 
Just how manipulable the standard can be is exemplified 
by Michigan v. Bryant,
42
 the first Confrontation Clause case in 
which Justice Scalia dissented. Covington, a shooting victim, 
made statements to police officers identifying Bryant, his drug 
dealer, as the assailant. The interactions occurred at least half 
an hour after the shooting and several miles away. Neither 
 
 37. Davis, 547 U.S. at 829. 
 38. Id. at 817. 
 39. See id. at 819. 
 40. See id. at 822. 
 41. See id. at 834 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 42. 562 U.S. 344 (2011). 
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Covington nor the police acted with any urgency in finding 
Bryant; the shooting apparently resulted from a drug deal gone 
bad, and there was no suggestion that a potential serial killer 
was on the loose. And yet the majority, in an opinion by Justice 
Sotomayor, held that the primary purpose of Covington’s 
statements was to resolve an ongoing emergency.
43
 The theory 
of the opinion was befuddling, especially because it attempted 
to determine an overall purpose of the conversations—even 
though questioner and declarant might obviously have very 
different understandings of the situation. Justice Scalia wrote a 
pained dissent, in which he argued, quite properly in my view, 
that the declarant’s perspective should govern in determining 
whether the statement was testimonial.
44
 
I believe Covington’s statements should have been deemed 
testimonial—they were clearly made for the purpose of 
identifying and bringing to justice the person who had shot 
him. But holding that the Confrontation Clause barred their 
admissibility would have been a most unappealing result, 
because Covington died of his wounds several hours later. Note 
how different the case would have looked had he survived and 
been readily available to testify at a trial of Bryant on 
attempted murder charges but either he or the prosecution 
decided that he would stay away. Nevertheless, the holding of 
Bryant would mean that even then the Confrontation Clause 
would impose no constraints on use of his out-of-court 
statements. 
Thus, Covington’s statements should have been deemed 
testimonial, but the Confrontation Clause should not have 
required their exclusion. How could that be? Even assuming, as 
Crawford suggested, that there might be a dying-declaration 
exception to the confrontation right, supported by history as a 
sui generis matter,
45
 it would not have applied, because there 
was no indication that at the time Covington made his 
statements he knew that his life was in imminent danger. But 
Bryant should have been an ideal case for application of a 
doctrine of forfeiture, which was a possibility also recognized by 
Crawford. That is, the trial court should have been able to 
make a threshold finding that the reason that Covington was 
unavailable at the time of trial was that Bryant had engaged in 
 
 43. Id. at 349. 
 44. Id. at 379 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 45. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004). 
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serious intentional misconduct—shooting Covington—that had 
the foreseeable effect of rendering Covington unavailable at 
trial, and that Bryant had therefore forfeited the confrontation 
right. 
That should have been a possibility—but it was foreclosed 
by Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Giles v. California.
46
 
Giles, accused of murdering his former girlfriend, Brenda Avie, 
acknowledged the killing but claimed self-defense. The 
prosecution sought to introduce a statement Avie had made to 
a responding police officer about three weeks earlier, accusing 
Giles of an act of domestic violence. Before the Supreme Court, 
the state did not dispute that Avie’s statement was testimonial, 
but it contended that Giles had forfeited the confrontation right 
by killing her.
47
 The Court held, however, that an accused does 
not forfeit the right unless the conduct that rendered the 
witness unavailable to testify at trial was “designed” to achieve 
that end.
48
 I have offered elsewhere reasons why I believe this 
decision was a mistake, not required by equity, common sense, 
or history.
49
 I will not repeat my vituperations here, other than 
to say that it was predictable—and predicted—at the time of 
Giles that its unduly narrow interpretation of forfeiture 
doctrine would lead to unduly narrow constructions of the term 
“testimonial,” and that this is precisely what happened in 
Bryant. If I am right, it is sadly ironic that such a devastating 
blow to the doctrine of the Confrontation Clause resulted, albeit 
indirectly, from an opinion by Justice Scalia that was overly 
protective of the Clause. 
In any event, before his death, Justice Scalia certainly had 
a strong sense that the Court was bent on cutting back further 
on the Crawford doctrine. Ohio v. Clark,
50
 the last 
Confrontation Clause case decided by the Court during his 
lifetime, was the first since Crawford to deal with statements 
by a young child. The outcome was not much in doubt; the 
 
 46. 554 U.S. 353 (2008). 
 47. Such a holding would require a threshold determination by the trial 
court that Giles killed Avie without justification, which is of course was the 
question before the jury on the merits of the case. But this should not have 
been a problem. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Giles v. California: A Personal 
Reflection, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 733, 736 (2009). 
 48. Giles, 554 U.S. at 368. 
 49. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 47, at 742–45; Richard D. Friedman, 
Come Back to the Boat, Justice Breyer!, 113 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 
1 (2014). 
 50. 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015). 
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Court was unanimous that the statements, made to preschool 
staff members by a boy not yet three-and-a-half years old, were 
not testimonial.
51
 But Justice Alito’s opinion for the majority 
seemed to Justice Scalia so determined to let the emergency 
doctrine of Davis swallow the basic regime of Crawford that he 
wrote a particularly anguished concurrence “to protest the 
Court’s shoveling of fresh dirt upon the Sixth Amendment right 
of confrontation so recently rescued from the grave in Crawford 
. . . .”
52
 
CONCLUSION 
The predictions of doom in Justice Scalia’s dissents had a 
way of becoming self-fulfilling.
53
 I hope that this will not prove 
to be true in the context of the Confrontation Clause. In the 
short term, I am not optimistic. Most of the developments since 
Crawford have been unfortunate, and some of the Justices have 
made clear their desire to limit Crawford to the extent they 
can. The most we can hope in this realm from a new 
appointment to the Court is that it will not make the situation 
worse than it has been. 
And yet, over the long run, I am optimistic because I 
believe that once a great conceptual threshold is crossed, courts 
will ultimately winnow out doctrine that does not work and 
embrace doctrine that does. I am hopeful that over time the 
Court will recognize that a more robust doctrine of forfeiture 
than the one created by Giles is appropriate, that when it does 
it will also adopt an ungrudging definition of the term 
“testimonial,” and that it will give full force to Melendez-Diaz. 
Perhaps I am being unduly optimistic, though I have the very 
long run in mind. In any event, the attempt to develop a sound 
conception of the Confrontation Clause is likely to persist for 
decades at least, and it will always be remembered that the 
Court took the first and most decisive step under the leadership 
of Justice Scalia, establishing that the Clause means what it 
says and that it expresses a principle that has been central to 
 
 51. Id. at 2177. 
 52. Id. at 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 53. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 601 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (saying, despite the majority’s insistence that the case did not 
require the Court to decide whether the government had to recognize formally 
any homosexual relationship, that the reasoning of the majority “leaves on 
pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples”). 
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our system for centuries: that an accused has a right to demand 
that witnesses against him testify face-to-face. 
 
